“THE HEINER AFFAIR AND THE QUEENSLAND GOVERNOR”
AUSTRALIANS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY
2005 Annual Conference
Paper by Kevin Lindeberg 11 Riley Drive Capalaba Q 4157 3390 3912 or 0401 224 013 27 August 2005
Mr. Chairman, ACM President, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am honoured to be invited to deliver this paper about “The Heiner Affair and the Queensland Governor” at your 2005 Annual Conference.
In looking at this gathering, there are some who have heard of the affair, and others whom, I suspect, have not. For those who have some knowledge of it, there have been significant developments in the last 4 months since I gave a paper to The Samuel Griffith Society in early April 2005, and for the others who may be wondering what it is all about, then I say, fasten your seatbelts.
Mr. Chairman, my paper is not a Geoffrey Robertson hypothetical. This is a living, breathing matter which not only concerns the good governance of Queensland, but concerns our system of government throughout the Federation. This is not “Kevin Lindeberg’s affair”. It belongs to all Australians who care about constitutional government and equality before the law.
Sir Guy Green, former Governor of Tasmania in his speech on the role of the Governor, in his 1999 Sir Robert Menzies Oration on Higher Education, said this concerning the role of the Governor , and it resonates throughout my paper. It supports my proposition that the reserve powers of the Crown’s representatives in Australia – that is, our Heads of State - ought not be codified but remain open and capable of handling all the mischief that can be heaped upon on them by all Australian governments from time to time: “…The rule of law antedates the emergence of democratic institutions and the principles of responsible government and is a condition of their effective operation. A fully representative parliament, free elections, universal suffrage and bills of rights mean nothing unless the rule of law prevails and the executive government is itself subject to the law.”
In short, non-adherence to the rule of law is a matter which should enliven the reserve powers of the Crown.
The Heiner affair has persisted for the last 15 years in “post-Fitzgerald” Queensland. It grew out of a decision by the Goss Government within days of taking control in 1990 which now gives rise to the most serious questions about the constitutional state of affairs in Queensland.
The decision to which I refer was the order by the Queensland Cabinet to deliberately destroy the Heiner Inquiry documents to prevent their known use as evidence in an anticipated judicial proceeding, and to prevent the contents of the gathered public records being used against the careers of the public servants involved. These public records were gathered during the course of a lawful inquiry into the management of the John Oxley Youth Detention Centre conducted by retired Stipendiary Magistrate Noel Heiner, from whom the affair’s name is derived.
The Inquiry was established in the final days of the Cooper National Party Government. Within weeks of the Goss Government coming to power, the Inquiry was shut down, and all the gathered material secretly destroyed. Let me present some key Heiner facts as they affect the rule of law and Queensland’s governance, but, of necessity, they are brief because I want time to cover, in greater detail, the serious constitutional questions which have arisen in the last 6 months.
Due Process Commenced
In January and February 1990, my union member, the manager of the detention Centre, sought to access the Heiner Inquiry documents, insofar as they were about him, under a public service “access” law. He also indicated that he may take defamation action. As his union organizer, I was required to protect his industrial interests.
His solicitors and two trade unions placed the Government on notice of foreshadowed court proceedings. It was done by letter, phone call and meeting. The Queensland Government was told not to destroy the evidence, and that if access was not granted “out of court”, then the matter would be settled “in court.” Unbeknown to us, the Families Department had meanwhile transferred the documents to the Office of Cabinet in a desire to gain access exemption under “Cabinet confidentiality” or “Crown privilege.”
The relevant February/March 1990 Cabinet submissions, which we now hold, divulge that all Cabinet members in attendance were aware that the documents were required as evidence in a foreshadowed judicial proceeding.
Crown Law advice, which we now hold, reveals that the Cabinet, and Crown Law, knew that the records would be discoverable evidence upon the serving of the anticipated writ.
By other evidence spoken in the media, we know that at least one Minister, if not all, were aware that those public records contained evidence about the known or suspected abuse of children at the Centre.
As each layer of cover-up has been peeled away, the presence of child abuse at the Centre surfaced after being concealed for years. It was primarily through the investigative journalistic skills of Mr. Bruce Grundy that the horrible truth became known. The abuse went from physical, psychological abuse to the offence of criminal paedophilia involving the sexual assault of a 14-year-old female indigenous minor in the lead up to the Inquiry. Worse, those working within government knew of such things at all relevant times, and did nothing about it. Some are still working in government.
The gravest legal and constitutional ramifications now flow from the shredding of the evidence and the assault against the female minor in State care as handled by our law-enforcement authorities. It is clear that authorities, including the Cabinet and the Legislature, could not face the horrendous political/legal/constitutional prospect that perhaps all members of the Queensland Cabinet of 5 March 1990 may be in serious breach of Criminal Code of Queensland.
In a nutshell, instead of upholding the law, all relevant law-enforcement and accountability arms of government collapsed in around the Cabinet’s shredding desire by declaring it perfectly legal when the law, properly applied, demanded otherwise.
Foreshadowed Judicial Proceedings Known
We were told by the Queensland Government that Crown Law was considering our access request. We were told that once the advice was received, we would be informed. That stayed our hand – we were, after all, dealing with ‘the model litigant’ – the Queensland Labor Government.
Unbeknown to us, the Queensland Government meanwhile had secretly sought urgent approval from the State Archivist on 23 February 1990 to have the records destroyed pursuant to the Libraries and Archives Act 1988. Her approval was obtained on the same day. However, Cabinet’s letter failed to inform the archivist of the known evidentiary value of the records for the foreshadowed judicial proceeding.
She was told that the records were“…no longer required or pertinent to the public record” at the very time the Queensland Government knew otherwise.
So while we were waiting patiently for the Crown Solicitor’s final advice regarding access or non-access, the Cabinet ordered the destruction of the evidence on 5 March 1990. The order was secretly carried out on 23 March 1990. Official notification did not come to us from the Government until 22 May 1990, weeks after all the sought-after records and evidence had been destroyed.
In this early March 1990 period, when discussing the matter with the Family Services Minister’s Private Secretary, I was inadvertently told of the shredding plans or act-of-shredding. I immediately challenged the proposed action only to be told the next day that the Minister would no longer deal with me. The Minister insisted on the union’s General Secretary and/or his Assistant taking over the case, which happened, and then several weeks later, I was summarily dismissed. My handling of this case was used as one of the excuses to dismiss me.
Before I was finally dismissed, I informed my union’s Executive that the shredding of the records represented a potential serious breach of the criminal law which could involve the entire Cabinet. It did not move them other than to remove me.
The Criminal Justice Commission and the Administration of Justice
In December 1990, I took my dismissal to the new Criminal Justice Commission (CJC).
This journey took me into the inner workings of Queensland’s criminal justice system and public administration. Both were found wanting. I was confronted with massive abuse of office like dissembling and delay, double standards, misleading of Parliament, conflicts of interest, errors and omissions, lost documents, failure to refer, tampered tapes, intimidation, threats, misquoting and misinterpreting the law.
The alleged offence, which I put to the CJC, was section 129 of the Griffith Criminal Code - destruction of evidence – provides for:
"Any person who, knowing that any book, document, or other thing of any kind, is or may be required in evidence in a judicial proceeding, wilfully destroys it or renders it illegible or undecipherable or incapable of identification, with intent thereby to prevent it from being used in evidence, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment with hard labour for three years."
Section 119 of the Criminal Code, dealing with the definition of “judicial proceeding”, reads as follows:
“In this chapter – ‘judicial proceeding’ includes any proceeding had or taken in or before any tribunal, or person, in which the evidence may be taken on oath.”
The CJC held that because the words “had or taken in or before” were in the present tense, it excluded a judicial proceeding in contemplation or anticipated. It held that section 129 could only be triggered once a judicial proceeding was on foot, even though it was within the knowledge of the doer that the relevant judicial proceeding was foreknown/contemplated or anticipated.
So in January 1993, the CJC considered it was perfectly reasonable for any competent lawyer, in this case, Crown legal officers, to advise a client, or Government, to destroy all the evidence up to the moment of the expected writ being filed or served, and to do it for the specific purpose of preventing its use in those anticipated proceedings.
I challenged its view. I said it was legal nonsense. I suggested that the alternatives of attempting to obstruct justice or a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice may also be available on the facts.
Under elementary statutory interpretation rules, the operative word in section 119 is “includes”. In other words, the term “judicial proceeding” was “unfettered” – but more of that later.
In 1993 the Senate established the Senate Select Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing as part of a federal government move to establish national whistleblower protection legislation. I presented a submission using the Heiner affair. Its August 1994 report unanimously recommended that the Goss Government review this case, and 8 other “unresolved” Queensland cases. The Goss Government declined to do so.
In December 1994, the Senate Select Committee on Unresolved Whistleblower Cases was set up. The Heiner affair was a specific term of reference. It took evidence throughout 1995.
The responsible CJC official and lawyer, made this so-called “legal declaration” concerning due process touching on the protection of evidence when appearing before the Committee:
“…What you do with your own property before litigation is commenced, I suggest, is quite different from what you do with it after it is commenced.”
The Queensland Government and CJC claimed that the Queensland Government acted on legal advice when ordering the destruction of the evidence. They pointed to advice of 23 January 1990 which relevantly said:
“…this advice is predicated on the fact that no legal action has been commenced which requires the production of those files…”
The CJC claimed that so long as the Queensland Government acted on legal advice, it could not be established that it was acting dishonestly.
The CJC said that it was not its duty to adjudicate between competing advices on the same legal point – that is, section 129 – but rather, so long as advice existed and had been acted upon – in effect any advice, including wrong advice - that was sufficient to give clearance to those involved in the shredding.
Concerning the matter of acting on legal advice, I point to Ostrowski, wherein Callinan and Heydon JJ, in 2004, in finding a guilty verdict against Mr. Palmer, a crayfisherman from Western Australia who obtained Crown advice before acting on it but which happened to be wrong, said: “…A mockery would be made of the criminal law if accused persons could rely on, for example, erroneous legal advice, or their own often self-serving understanding of the law as an excuse for breaking it…” Inviting a World Without Evidence
The CJC’s position on “due process” invited open slather on the Judiciary’s constitutional function by the Executive in terms of willfully destroying evidence required for court. In effect, the CJC invited and permitted the Executive to breach the doctrine of the separation of powers with impunity.
The CJC was suggesting that all evidence in the possession or control of a party, including the Queensland Government, could be legally and proactively destroyed up to the moment of the expected writ being filed and/or served. If this were correct at law, it would mean that there would be no evidence left for any legal proceeding. We would have a “world without evidence.”
My senior counsel, Mr. Ian Callinan QC, advised the Senate Committee for anyone to destroy known evidence which is or may be required in judicial proceedings was an “unthinkable” act - and more serious when done by a government.
Mr. Callinan QC advised that the CJC’s strict, narrow interpretation of judicial proceedings was “…too significant to ignore”. He went on to advise that section 129 may have been breached, or section 132 of the Criminal Code – conspiracy to pervert the course of justice - in the alternative. He cited R v Rogerson as the leading authority.
In its October 1995 report the Senate Select Committee described the shredding as “…an exercise in poor judgement” . It failed to address Mr. Callinan QC’s advice.
The Morris/Howard Report
In May 1996, the Borbidge Queensland Government appointed two independent barristers Messrs. Anthony Morris QC and Edward Howard to investigate my allegations “on the papers” and to recommend to Government whether or not an open inquiry should be held.
In their October 1996 report, they found that it was open to conclude that numerous criminal offences may have been committed, that is, breaches of section 129, 132 and/or 140, 92 and 204 of the Criminal Code, including official misconduct. They recommended the immediate establishment of a public inquiry because the serious offences unearthed were far more serious than the offences which brought the famous Fitzgerald Inquiry into being in 1987.
Morris QC and Howard argued that section 129 it did not require a judicial proceeding to be on foot to trigger it. They roundly criticized the conduct of the CJC. They suggested that its investigation was neither thorough nor independent.
Instead of establishing a public inquiry, the Borbidge Government sent the report to the DPP to be advised (a) as to the correct interpretation of section 129; (b) of whether charges could be brought against those named; and (c) of whether a public inquiry should be held.
After a 6-month delay, the Borbidge Government announced that the DPP had advised that (a) it was not in the public interest to hold an inquiry; (b) certain officials could be charged but it was not in the public interest to do so. There was, however, no announcement about the proper interpretation of section 129.
The Smoking Gun – The January 1997 DPP’s Advice
Let me turn to this DPP’s advice. It currently remains hidden from public scrutiny. It is, in my view, the “smoking gun.”
I have read it. I can say with certainty that it erroneously interprets section 129. It claims that a judicial proceeding must be on foot before it can be triggered. Now let me turn to two further events which ran almost concurrently. Federal Government Intervention The Federal Government’s Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs was commissioned by the Justice Minister, Senator the Hon Chris Ellison in May 2002 to hold a national inquiry into “crime in the community: victims, offenders and fear of crime.” This Committee was chaired by the Hon Bronwyn Bishop MP. I placed the Heiner affair before it during 2003 and 2004.
In August 2004, the Committee handed down its report into the Heiner affair, but not before all ALP members of Committee resigned en masse.
The Committee recommended criminal charges be laid against all members of the Goss Cabinet pursuant to section 129 of the Criminal Code in respect of their order to destroy the Heiner Inquiry documents. It recommended also that an independent Special Prosecutor be appointed to investigate the affair, and that the January 1997 DPP’s advice be made public.
Double Standards on Public Display
The second event was the charging of a Queensland citizen, a Pastor Douglas Ensbey with the offence of destroying evidence required for a judicial proceeding. He guillotined a 14-year-old girl’s diary which contained evidence about her being abused by a parishioner. The pastor was committed and ordered to stand trial on 13 March 2003 pursuant to section 129, or in the alternate, section 140 (attempting to obstruct justice) by the shredding of evidence. Its relevance to the Heiner affair was that his shredding conduct occurred some 5 to 6 years before the relevant judicial proceeding commenced. Yet, remember, according to the same law-enforcement authorities, such action could not apply in Heiner because the anticipated proceedings had not commenced.
I witnessed this shredding trial throughout. Within 5 minutes of the District Court trial commencing, the court ruled that section 129 did not require a judicial proceeding to be on foot to trigger the provision.
On 11 March 2004, Pastor Ensbey was found guilty of breaching section 129. And then, on 25 March 2004, Queensland’s Chief Law Officer, the Attorney-General appealed the leniency of sentence to the Queensland Court of Appeal because of the seriousness of the crime, in doing so using my interpretation of section 129. On 17 September 2004, the Court of Appeal upheld the interpretation of section 129, and the conviction, but rejected any increase in sentence.
Unarguable Criminal Provision
Jerrard JA’s reasoning in Ensbey on the definition of “judicial proceeding” is devastatingly relevant. He demonstrated its unambiguous unfettered meaning by its plain reading and application to the offence of perjury (i.e. section 123) where it talks about committing perjury “…to institute a judicial proceeding.” In short, it was “unfettered” in perjury and could not be therefore “fettered” when dealing with the destruction of evidence because consistency and predictability must apply under statutory interpretative principles.
This was no surprise. In April/May 2003, well before Ensbey was settled, retired former Appeal and Supreme Court of Queensland Justice the Hon James Thomas advised The Independent Monthly that while many laws were indeed arguable, section 129 was not. It plainly included a proceeding not yet on foot but one within contemplation of the doer. He suggested that those involved in any breach may still be open to charges.
In short, it is my contention that the erroneous interpretation of section 129 used to thwart my pursuit of justice for 15 years, was never one which should have ever been involved.
Let me sum up with some germane considerations. Former United States Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter is credited with having said:
“…if one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny. Legal process is an essential part of the democratic process.”
Courts need evidence to do justice in adjudicating disputes . Concerning the protection of evidence, its admissibility and discovery/disclosure, it is ultimately for the courts, in a democracy, to decide what is and what is not admissible in evidence in a judicial proceeding . It does not fall on the parties to decide unilaterally for themselves to advantage themselves. The Executive may not unilaterally decide for itself what is or is not required by the Judiciary and be permitted to embark on a unilateral shredding exercise when party to litigation.
Executive Government is not above the law as the High Court ruled in FAI Ltd v Winneke and A v Hayden.
It is known that power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely. I believe that there must be limits placed on power and its exercise through checks and balances but we do not have that in Queensland with our unicameral Parliamentary system.
The Great Contract of Trust
Our Australian system of government requires the Crown’s representative, its Ministers of State and elected representatives that in all things, at all times, for all parties, the law and Constitution shall be respected and upheld. Before power can be exercised over the people, the governors and/or administrators seal this great contract by a sworn Oath of Office.
It is well settled that neither Sovereign, Head of State, President nor executive government should be above the law in societies which claim to be governed by the rule of law, any more than you or I are above the law. This democratic principle engenders public confidence and trust in government. It binds us together as a nation. We have sacrificed our lives for this principle.
Thomas Jefferson said:
“…The two enemies of the people are criminals and government, so let us tie the second down with the chains of the Constitution so the second will not become the legalized version of the first."
When and if the Crown’s Ministers place themselves beyond the law and constitutional custom, the ultimate guardian is the Crown itself. In Australia’s constitutional monarchy system, the role of the Governor-General or State Governor – as Heads of State - must be, in the last resort, to invoke the Crown’s discretionary reserve powers in order to ensure compliance with the general law and the effective working of parliamentary democracy.
In my opinion, we may have such an extraordinary circumstance now in the shape of the Heiner affair.
Invoking the State Governor’s Discretionary Reserve Powers
On 13 October 2003 and again on 20 September 2004 I placed these matters before Queensland’s Governor the Hon Quentin Bryce. I believed that her Government was wilfully placing itself beyond the reach of the criminal law by abuse of power. I held that the Governor could “encourage” her Government to appoint a Special Prosecutor to finally resolve the matter, or take other necessary measures within her constitutional discretion , in order to restore public confidence in government.
As I said at the beginning of my paper, the Hon Sir Guy Green said that Governors in fulfilling their constitutional function had a duty to the principle of maintaining the rule of law.
In my view, the Governor need only satisfy herself that suspected official misconduct exists in this affair which is not being addressed equally and properly by her Government thereby placing itself beyond the reach of the law by self-serving abuse of office, and that may trigger her discretionary reserve powers.
After receiving my first letter of 13 October 2003, Her Excellency requested a report from the Premier on the Heiner affair on 21 October 2003. On 26 April 2005, over 18 months later, she was provided with the report. It was purportedly delayed by the Queensland Government until the Ensbey case was settled.
I also put these legal/constitutional issues to the Queensland Premier by letters dated 15 October and 22 November 2004. I requested that a Special Prosecutor be appointed because the CMC and police were tainted and not free of real or apprehended bias. Premier Beattie refused. He claimed that my allegations had been “…exhaustively investigated” – a claim which is simply untrue, and arguably self-serving. In declining my request, Premier Beattie knew that the CJC and DPP’s clearance in Heiner was based on an erroneous interpretation of section 129.
On 23 March 2005, in a letter to the Governor, I put the significance of Heiner affair in these terms:
“…The criminal law only carries a moral and constitutional basis of authority and respect in a democracy if it is applied equally by government against all citizens who transgress it. That is government by the rule of law. If, however, the law becomes an instrument of sectional application by government for government, such conduct is unfair and oppressive and sets government in conflict with democracy itself and the rule of law. That is tyranny.”
In April 2005, an important submission fell off the back of a truck whose driver was “a Mr. Doug Ensbey.” The former pastor had been sacked by the Baptist Church after the Court of Appeal ruling because of his criminal record.
His legal team put a submission to the DPP on 13 October 2003 before the District Court trial commenced. They cited the former DPP’s interpretation of section 129 as used in the Heiner affair as good cause not to bring charges against their client under section 129. The current DPP declined. She said section 129’s ambit was wide enough to include “futurity”, and that it was in the public interest to prosecute him. He was found guilty.
On 5 August 2005, I was informed by Mr. Beattie that the Governor was informed about the former DPP’s interpretation of section 129 in his January 1997 advice. In other words, the Governor, a barrister herself, knows that the DPP got the criminal law wrong.
So, when the State of Queensland prosecuted one of its citizen’s in 2004 over his shredding conduct to the full extent our criminal justice system allowed, it unquestionably knew that Queensland Ministers of the Crown and senior bureaucrats who engaged in the same shredding conduct - if not far worse conduct - were not charged because the same law was interpreted incorrectly.
The Governor informed me on 24 May 2005 that she had received the Government’s report, considered it, and had decided to do nothing.
I had earlier provided her with (the late) Sir Harry Gibbs’ 15 April 2005 opinion on the Heiner affair which flowed out of my paper to The Samuel Griffith Society. He was, at the time, this nation’s pre-eminent authority on the Criminal Code. Sir Harry advised that those involved in the shredding of the Heiner Inquiry documents were, at least, in prima facie breach of section 129.
In the meantime, on 19 May 2005, the Queensland Opposition had written to Premier Beattie giving him permission to access the January 1997 DPP’s advice, and to provide a copy to the Governor. It is unclear whether that was ever done.
In another earlier step, the Opposition had forwarded Mrs. Bishop’s Committee’s Report and the Ensbey decision to Queensland’s Police Commissioner on 27 January 2005 seeking action after the current DPP had informed the Opposition on 24 December 2004 that she could not act without a preliminary report of criminal offences from the police.
On 10 May 2005, the Police Commissioner accepted that my allegation may need to be revisited because section 129 was breached. But he passed that duty, despite my allegations being about breaches of the Criminal Code, to the CMC. He advised Mr. Springborg to contact the CMC which he did on 19 May 2005.
On 5 July 2005 the Chairman of the CMC responded to Mr. Springborg. The CMC also accepted that section 129 had been breached, but the CMC would not reinvestigate the matter and expend resources because it was not in the public interest to do so.
It cited 4 reasons:
- The staleness of the issue – despite the fact I have been at the coalface constantly for 15 years pointing out its erroneous interpretations of the law, unearthing new evidence constantly, and claiming that the CJC was engaging in a cover up;
- The previous consideration by the DPP – this is the DPP who interpreted section 129 erroneously, and having done so, then suggested that it wasn’t in the public interest to hold an inquiry;
- The numerous and extensive inquiries into the matter since 1991 - some of which never happened or reported, or were totally irrelevant save the CJC’s own initial deeply flawed January 1993 clearance findings, and latterly the 1996 Morris/Howard Report and the 2004 Bishop Report which overwhelmingly found in my favour.
- The lack of utility of proceeding so long after the event given that the Cabinet acted on Crown Law advice (notwithstanding mistake of law is no defence to a criminal offence, but it may be relevant to the exercise of the discretion to prosecute).
In my opinion, the CMC’s view of “the public interest” is its own self-interest. It is not the public’s. It is also in the interest of those who have engaged in serious wrongdoing and others who have aided in covering this matter up for years. In short, the system is in the dock.
If the public interest means anything in a democracy, it is equality before the law.
On 11 July 2005, Premier Beattie, a solicitor, after having these matters put to him again by me, said that my additional material had not altered his view about not appointing a Special Prosecutor.
I remind you, around the same time, both the police and CMC had accepted that section 129 had been breached but Premier Beattie could see no wrongdoing.
And, then, using the last dainty feather behind which he is dancing, he claimed, as some form of relief, that the Goss Cabinet, acted “…on the best legal advice at the time.” The fact that this advice was wrong at law didn’t seem to bother to him as either Premier, sworn to uphold the law, or solicitor, sworn as an officer of the court.
I conclude on these comments. Voltaire warned that it is dangerous to be right when the government is wrong. I believe if freedom matters, oppression and abuse of power simply must be resisted. I believe that one person’s stand can make a difference.
Even after 15 years struggling for justice, I hold firm to the principle of equality before the law for all. It matters. It is a non-negotiable value of this nation. It sustains our freedom and democracy.
Those in public office, with a sworn duty to uphold the law and the Queensland Constitution - which particularly includes the Governor - ought not allow this matter to remain unresolved. Difficult though it may be, right must be done. To do nothing, imperils our democratic heritage. It reduces the law and the administration of justice to ridicule. It undermines the integrity of the Queensland Crown.
When Government decides to put itself outside the law, the Governor must bring it back within the law, and if necessary, exercise the reserve powers. That’s what they are there for. It is the genius of our constitutional monarchy. The action can be swift and decisive, not prolonged like an American impeachment process. The role of the Crown is protector from oppressive government and it is a high duty.
Finally, my mind is ironically cast back to another time in another place at another historic moment in this nation’s history. As I am sure that this affair will eventually explode and the truth will out, and that the law and right will prevail over abuse of power and dereliction of duty, I have to say this because of a pointed failure to act:
“Well may we say God Save the Queen, because nothing will save the Queensland Governor.”